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In this paper we consider a network of boolean agents that compete for a limited resource. The
agents play the so called Generalized Minority Game where the capacity level is allowed to vary
externally. We study the properties of such a system for different values of the mean connectivity
K of the network, and show that the system with K = 2 shows a high degree of coordination for
relatively large variations of the capacity level.
Complex adaptive systems composed of agents under
mutual influence have attracted considerable interest in
recent years. A few examples that have been studied
extensively are genetic regulatory networks [1], ecosys-
tems [2], and financial markets [3]. These kinds of sys-
tems often display rich and complex dynamics and have
been shown to posses global properties that cannot be
simply deduced from the details of the microscopic be-
havior of individual agents.
The Minority Game [4] (MG) is one of the simplest ex-
amples of a complex dynamical system. It was introduced
by Challet and Zhang as a simplification of Arthur’s El
Farol Bar attendance problem [5]. The MG consists of N
agents with bounded rationality that repeatedly choose
between two alternatives labelled 0 and 1 (e.g., staying
at home or going to the bar). At each time step, agents
who made the minority decision win. In the Generalized
Minority Game [6], the wining group is 1 (0) if the frac-
tion of the agents who chose “1” is smaller (greater) than
the capacity level η, 0 < η < 1 (for η = 0.5, the game
reduces to the the traditional MG). Each agent uses a
set of S strategies to decide its next move and reinforces
strategies that would have predicted the winning group.
A strategy is simply a lookup table that prescribes a bi-
nary output for all possible inputs. In the original ver-
sion of the game, the input is a binary string containing
the last m outcomes of the game, so the agents interact
by sharing the same global signal. If the agents choose
either action with probability 1/2 (the random choice
game), then, on average, the number of agents choosing
“1” (henceforth referred to as attendance) is (N − 1)/2
with standard deviation σ =
√
N/2 in the limit of large
N . The most interesting phenomenon of the minority
model is the emergence of a coordinated phase, where
the standard deviation of attendance, the volatility, be-
comes smaller than in the random choice game. The
coordination is achieved for memory sizes for which the
dimension of the reduced strategy space is comparable
to the number of agents in the system[7, 8], 2m ∼ N . It
was later pointed out [9] that the dynamics of the game
remains mostly unchanged if one replaces the string with
the actual histories with a random one, provided that
all the agents act on the same signal. Analytical studies
based on this simplification have revealed many interest-
ing properties of the minority model[10, 11].
In addition to the original MG, different versions of the
game where the agents interact using local information
only (cellular automata [12], evolving random boolean
networks [13], personal histories [14]), have been stud-
ied. In particular, it was established that coordination
still arises out of local interactions, and the system as
a whole achieves “better than random” performance in
terms of the utilization of resources. Note that although
the minority game was introduced as a toy model of the
financial markets, it can serve as a general paradigm
for resource allocation and load balancing in multi–agent
systems.
In all previous studies the capacity level has been fixed
as an external parameter, so the environment in which
the agents compete is stationary. In many situations,
however, agents have to operate in dynamic (and in gen-
eral, stochastic) environments. It is interesting to see
if coordinated behavior still emerges, and to what de-
gree agents can adapt to the changing environment. We
address this problem in the present paper. Namely, we
study a system of boolean agents playing a generalized
minority game, assuming that the capacity level is not
fixed but varies with time, η(t) = η0 + η1(t), where η1(t)
is a time dependent perturbation. The framework of the
interactions is based on Kauffman NK random boolean
nets [1], where each agent gets its input from K other
randomly chosen agents, and maps the input to a new
state according to a boolean function of K variables,
which is also randomly chosen and quenched through-
out the dynamics of the system. The generalization we
make is that agents are allowed to adapt by having more
than one boolean function, or strategy, and the use of
a particular strategy is determined by an agent based
on how often it predicted the winning group throughout
the game. Note that this approach is very different from
adaptation through evolution studied previously in the
context of the minority model [13].
Our main observation is that networks with small K
(K < 5) adapt to a certain degree to the changes in the
2capacity level. In particular, networks with K = 2 show
a tendency towards self–organization into a phase char-
acterized by small fluctuations, hence, an efficient utiliza-
tion of the resource, even for relatively large variations
in the capacity level η(t). Note, that in the Kauffman
nets with K > 2 the dynamics of the system is chaotic
with an exponentially increasing length of attractors as
the system size grows, while for K < 2 the network
reaches a frozen configuration. The case K = 2 corre-
sponds to a phase transition in the dynamical properties
of the network and is often referred as the “edge of the
chaos”[1]. We would like to reiterate, however, that our
system is different from a Kauffman network since the
agents have an internal degree of freedom, characterized
by their strategies. Specifically, our system does not nec-
essarily have periodic attractors, while in Kauffman nets
periodic attractors are guaranteed to exist due to the fi-
nite phase space and quenched rules of updating.
Let us consider a set of N boolean agents described by
“spin” variables si = {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , N . Each agent
gets its input from K other randomly chosen agents, and
maps the input to a new state:
si(t+ 1) = F
j
i (sk1(t), sk2 (t), ..., skK (t)) (1)
where ski , i = 1, . . . ,K are the set of neighbors, and
F ji , j = 1, . . . , S are randomly chosen boolean functions
(called strategies hereafter) used by the i-th agent. For
each strategy F ji , the agent keeps a score that monitors
the performance of that strategy, adding (subtracting)
a point if the strategy predicted the winning (loosing)
side. Let the “attendance”A(t) be the cumulative output
of the system at time t, A(t) =
∑N
i=1 si(t). Then the
winning choice is ”1” if A(t) ≤ Nη(t), and ”0” otherwise.
Those in the wining group are awarded a point while the
others loose one. Agents play the strategies that have
predicted the winning side most often, and the ties are
broken randomly.
As a global measure of optimality we consider δ(t) =
A(t)−Nη(t), that describes the deviation from the opti-
mal resource utilization. We are primarily interested in
the cumulative “waste” over a certain time window:
σ =
√√√√ 1
T
t0+T∑
t=t0
δ(t)2 (2)
For η1(t) = 0 this quantity is simply the volatility as de-
fined in the traditional minority game. We compare the
performance of our system to a default random choice
game, defined as follows: assume that the agents are told
what is the capacity η(t) at time t, and they choose to go
to the bar with probability η(t). In this case the main at-
tendance will be close to η(t)N at each time step, and the
fluctuations around the mean are given by the standard
deviation
σ20 = N
1
T
∫ t0+T
t0
dt′η(t′)[1 − η(t′)] (3)
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FIG. 1: A segment of the attendance time series for η(t) =
0.5+0.1sin(2pit/T ),T = 500; a) Boolean network with K = 2,
b) traditional (generalized) minority game with m = 6. The
insets show the respective time series of the deviation δ(t).
We performed intensive numerical simulations of the
system described above, with the number of agents rang-
ing from 100 to 104, and for network connectivityK rang-
ing from 1 to 10. Although in our simulations we used
different forms for the perturbation η1(t), in this paper
we consider periodic perturbations only. For each K, a
set of strategies was chosen for each agent randomly and
independently from a pool of 22
K
possible boolean func-
tions, and was quenched throughout the game. In all
simulations we used S = 2 strategies per agent. Starting
from a random initial configuration, the system evolved
according to the specified rules. The duration of the sim-
ulation T0 was determined by the particular choice of
η(t). Depending on the amplitude of the perturbation,
we run the simulations for 10 to 20 periods, and usually
used the data for the last two periods to determine σ.
Figure 1 (a) shows a typical segment of the time series
of the attendance A(t) for a system of size N = 1000,
network connectivity K = 2, and a sinusoidal perturba-
tion η1(t). One can see that the system is efficient —
it adapts very quickly to changes in the capacity level.
The inset shows the time series of the deviation δ(t).
Initially there are strong fluctuations, hence poor utiliza-
tion of the resource, but after some transient time the
system as a whole adapts and the strength of the fluctu-
ations decreases. In particular, for the system sizes con-
sidered in this paper (up to N = 104) σ is considerably
3smaller than the standard deviation σ0 in the random
choice game. This should not hold for sufficiently large
N , however, since σ/
√
N increases slowly with N (see be-
low), while for the random choice game σ0 ∝
√
N . Note
also, that the agents have information only about the
winning choice, but not the capacity level. This suggests
that the particular form of the perturbation may not be
important as long as it meets some general criteria for
smoothness.
We also studied the effect of the changing capacity level
in the traditional (generalized) minority model with pub-
licly available information about the last m outcomes of
the game. We plot the attendance and deviation time
series for a system with a memory size m = 6 (corre-
sponding to the minimum of σ) in Fig. 1 (b). One can
see that in this case the system also reacts to the external
change; however, the overall performance in terms of ef-
ficiency of resource allocation, as described by σ, is much
poorer compared to the previous case.
Another interesting observation is that if we run the
simulations long enough, the response of the system to
the changing capacity level gets “out of phase” with the
perturbation, leading to a gradual deterioration in the
performance of the system, and the time during which
the efficient phase is stable strongly depends on the rate
of the changes in the capacity level, as well as on the num-
ber of agents in the system. Our results suggest that this
effect is due to the increasing gap in strategy scores. As
the gap in strategy scores grows, it becomes increasingly
difficult for an agent to abandon a previously more suc-
cessful strategy that has stopped performing well as the
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FIG. 2: Time series of attendance (top) and the gap in strat-
egy scores (bottom) for the square-shaped capacity level vari-
ations
capacity level changes, because it takes longer for a previ-
ously loosing strategy to accumulate enough points to be
played. We demonstrate this effect on a simpler, square-
like perturbation depicted in Fig. 2. One can see that
each time the capacity “jumps” to its new value, it takes
longer for the agents to adapt to the change. To illus-
trate why this happens, we plot the evolution of the gap
(difference) ∆U(t) in strategy scores for one agent. For
pedagogical reasons, we chose an agent with the simplest
anti-correlated strategies: one of whose strategies always
chooses “0” and the other “1”, regardless of input. As
the amplitude of the oscillations in score difference grows
in time, it takes longer for the agent to switch between
strategies. The same is true for the difference between
strategy scores averaged over all agents, resulting in a
growing lag between attendance and the new capacity
level after a “jump”. Remarkably, one can get rid of
the dephasing effect simply by introducing an upper and
lower bounds for the strategy scores, thus, limiting their
maximum difference.
In Fig. 3 we plot the variance per agent versus network
connectivity K, for system sizes N = 100, 500, 1000. For
each K we performed 32 runs and averaged results. Our
simulations suggest that the details of this dependence
are not very sensitive to the particular form of the per-
turbation η1(t), and the general picture is the same for a
wide range of functions, provided that they are smooth
enough. As we already mentioned, the variance attains
its minimum for K = 2, independent of the number of
agents in the system. For bigger K it saturates at a
value that depends on the amplitude of the perturbation
and on the number of agents in the system. We found
that for large K the time series of the attendance closely
resembles the time series in the absence of perturbation.
This implies that for large K the agents do not “feel” the
change in the capacity level. Consequently, the standard
deviation increases linearly with the number of agents in
the system, σ ∝ N . For K = 2, on the other hand, σ
increases considerably slower with the number of agents
in the system, σ ∝ Nγ , γ < 1 (see the inset in Fig. 3).
Our results indicate that the scaling (i.e., the exponent
γ) is not universal and depends on the perturbation.
Though the results presented here look very interest-
ing, we currently do not have an analytical theory for
the observed emergent coordination. In contrast to the
traditional minority game, where global interactions and
the Markovian approximation allow one to construct a
mean field description, our model seems to be analyti-
cally intractable due to the explicit emphasis on local in-
formation processing. We strongly believe, however, that
the adaptability of the networks with K = 2 is related to
the peculiar properties of the corresponding Kauffman
nets, and particularly, to the phase transition between
the chaotic and frozen phases. It is known [15] that
the phase transition in the Kauffman networks can be
achieved by tuning the homogeneity parameter P which
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FIG. 3: σ2/N vs the network connectivity for different system
sizes and η(t) = 0.5 + 0.15sin(2pit/T ),T = 1000. Inset plot
shows the scaling relationship between σ and N for K = 2.
Average over 16 runs has been taken.
is the fraction of 1’s or 0’s in the output of the boolean
functions (whichever is greater), with the critical value
given by Pc = 1/2+1/2
√
1− 2/K. To test our hypothe-
sis, we studied the properties of networks with K = 3 for
a range of homogeneity parameter P . In Fig. 4 we plot
σ2/n versus the homogeneity parameter P . One can see
that the optimal resource allocation is indeed achieved in
the vicinity of the Pc ≈ 0.78.
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FIG. 4: Standard deviation per agent vs P for K=3 networks:
N=1000, η(t) = 0.5 + 0.15 sin(2pit/T ), T = 1000
In conclusion, we studied a network of adaptive
boolean agents competing in a dynamic environment. We
established that networks with connectivity K = 2 can
be extremely adaptable and robust with respect to ca-
pacity level changes. For K > 2 the coordination can
be achieved by tuning the homogeneity parameter to its
critical value. Remarkably, adaptation happens without
the agents knowing the capacity level. Interestingly, the
system that uses local information is much more efficient
in a dynamic environment than a system that uses global
information. This suggests that our model may serve as
a feasible mechanism for distributed resource allocation
in multi-agent systems.
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